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IN THE SUPR.EME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORIN PEC·K and 
MARY C. PECK, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
WILLIAM REED JUDD, JR., and 
THEDA vV. JUDD, his wife, 





(Numbers in parenthesis refer t~o pages of the record. 
Page 103 of the record should follow Page 100.) 
This action was instituted by plaintiffs to regain 
possession of the property subject to the suit, for a 
writ of repossession, to adjudge defendants guilty of 
unlawful detainer, for treble damages, and for costs and 
disbursements and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The court adjudged plaintiffs entitled to immediate 
possession, defendants guilty of unlawful detainer, plain-
tiffs entitled to writ of restituti~on, defendants were not 
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entitled to any relief on their counterclaims and have 
no equity in property and contract null and void and 
wholly ineffective for any purpose whatsoever and should 
be cancelled and terminated. 
An appeal is taken by defendants. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS FINDING DEFENDANTS 
WERE IN DEFAULT, FORFEITURE WAS AGREEMENT OF 
PARTIES IN EVENT OF DEFAULT, LIQUIDATED DAM-
AGES IN AMOUNT AWARDED WAS PURSUANT TO 
CONTRACT, LIQUIDATED DAMAGES WERE NOT UNCON-
SCOUNABLE AND WERE IN FACT LESS THAN DEFEND-
ANTS TOOK FROM PROPERTIES, AND FORFEITURE 
BASED ON ACTS OF DEFENDANTS AND JUSTIFIED 
UNDER LAW OF STATE OF UTAH. 
POINT II. 
TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT EXCLUDE DEFENDANTS' 
EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO IMPROVEMENTS AND DID NOT 
ERR IN EXCLUDING DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE AS TO 
MAINTENANCE. 
POINT III. 
EVIDENCE SUSTAINS FINDING THAT PROPERTIES 
INVOLVED HAD A REASONABLE l\IARI{ET VALUE OF 
$40,000.00, AT THE TIME PLAINTIFFS TOOK OVER ACTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTIES FROM DEFENDANTS. 
POINT IV. 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT REQUIRING PLAIN-
TIFFS TO REFUND TO DEFENDANTS ALL MONIES PAID 
TO PLAINTIFFS BY DEFENDANTS ON CONTRACT TERli-
INATED BY DEFENDANTS BY REASON OF DEFAULT OF 
DEFENDANTS. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO CONTRAC·Ts 
On September 30, 1950, Lorin Peck and Mary C. 
Peck hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs, respondents 
herein, under .an Apartment Listing on a Sales Agency 
Contract of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board Multiple 
Listing Bureau, listed the properties known as 121 to 
130 East 7th South and 658 to 664 Edison Street, to sell 
for the price of $75,000.00, requiring $35,000.00 cash and 
the balance of $40,000.00, at $300.00 per month with 
interest at 4% per annum, indic.ating that the units con-
tained 23 apartments, three of which were furnished, 
together with four garages. Said listing cited a mortgage 
contract of $40,000, payable at $300.00 per month to 
Floyd Burge and bearing 4% interest on unpaid b.alance. 
Said listing was with R. J. Chapman of Utah Realty 
and Construction Co. Exhibit 15. 
On Oct~ober 24, 1950, William R. Judd, Jr. and Theda 
W. Judd, hereinafter referred to as the defendants, 
appellants herein, together with Lorin Peck, one of plain-
tiffs, signed an Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement 
whereby defendants were to pay to plaintiffs the sum 
of $75,000.00 for said properties, $4,600.00 in equity in 
a real estate contract and the balance at the rate of 
$600.00 per month, plus 1/12 of the ye.arly taxes, payable 
monthly, and interest of 4% on the amount due by plain-
tiffs on their contract of purchase with Burge and 5% 
on the balance of the amount over and above the amount 
due Burge and due and owing to plaintiffs. Exhibit 16. 
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On October 25, 1950, plaintiffs and defendants signed 
and executed a Uniform Real Estate Contract p~roviding 
f~or the sale of said properties from plaintiffs to defend-
ants for the sum of $75,000.00 payable $10,700.00 down 
as cash, and $600.00 or more, on December 1, 1950, and 
$600.00 or more, on or before the first day of each and 
every month thereafter until the entire principal, to-
gether with interest, shall have been paid in full, and 
it was also provided that defendants are to deposit 
monthly with plaintiffs a sum equal to 1/12 of the annual 
tax for the preceding calendar year, and prior to the 
30th day of November, of each year the sums thus 
deposited shall be applied in payment of general taxes 
for the current year, and defendants agreed that at any 
time there was .a deficiency between the amount deposited 
and the amount due, to make up the same. Interest was 
to be at the rate of 4% on the amount due by plaintiffs 
to Burge and 5% on the difference between the amount 
due to Burge and the balance due on said Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. Exhibit 1. 
A pertinent provision of said contract reads as 
f~ollo\YS : H In the eYent of a failure to coin ply "ith the 
ter1ns h0reof the Buyer~ or upon failure to make any 
pay1nents \\~hen the sa1ne shall beeo1ne due, or -within 
thirty days thereafter, the Seller, shall, at his option, 
h<\ relPa f'rd fro In .all o big a tions in la"T and equity to 
eonvPy said propt•rty and all payments \Yhieh ha\e been 
ntade thrrptofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall 
be for-feited to the Seller as liquidated da1nages for the 
non-pPrrorinance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees 
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that the Seller may, at his option, re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal process as in 
its first and f~ormer estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the 
said additions and improvements shall remain with the 
land and become the property of the Seller, the Buyer 
becoming .at once a tenant at will of the Seller. It is 
agreed that time is the essence of this agreement." Ex-
hibit 1. 
Taxes on said premises, for the year designated, were 
as follows: 
Year Amount Due 
1950 $659.28 1/6 for $ 109.88 
two months 
1951 734.08 734.08 
1952 652.63 652.63 
1953 671.01 671.01 
1954 719.42 719.42 
1955 786.61 786.61 
$3673.63 
See Exhibit 11. 
EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO PAYMENTS 
Defendants paid to plaintiffs pursuant to said Uni-
form Real Estate Contract the following sums on the 
date indicated, (Exhibit 11, which was stipulated to as 
the payments made by all parties hereto at the initial 
hearing): 
Oct. 25, 1950 
Dec. 5, 1950 
Jan. 1, 1951 
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Mar. 8,1951 655.00 
Apr. 12, 1951 655.00 
May 10, 1951 655.00 
June 13, 1951 655.00 
July 12, 1951 600.00 
Aug. 13, 1951 600.00 
Sept. 14, 1951 600.00 
Oct. 11, 1951 625.00 
Nov. 1, 1951 49.00 
Nov. 19, 1951 600.00 
Dec. 18, 1951 600.00 
Jan. 23, 1952 600.00 
Mar. 1, 1952 600.00 
Apr. 1, 1952 600.00 
May 10, 1952 600.00 
June 20, 1952 600.00 
Aug.1, 1952 6:27.00 
Sept.5,1952 455.00 
Oct. 4, 1952 455.00 
Nov. 12, 1952 455.00 
Nov. 29, 1952 254.64 
Jan. 12, 1953 455.00 
Feb. 7, 1953 455.00 
1\far. 6, 1953 455.00 
Apr. 7, 1953 455.00 
l\Iay 7, 1953 455.00 
June 1:2, 1953 455.00 
July 7, 1953 455.00 
Aug·. 1~, 1953 455.00 
'" Sept.l7,1953 455.30 
NoY. 1, 1953 455.00 
Nov. ~s, 1953 5:21.00 
.T.an. 6, 1954 455.00 
Feb. 23, 1954 455.00 
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Apr. 6, 1954 
May 24, 1954 
June 28, 1954 
July 31, 1954 
Sept. 4, 1954 
Nov. 28, 1954 
Oct. 9, 1954 
Jan.10,1955 
Mar.8, 1955 
Apr. 8, 1955 
May 10,1955 
June 4,1955 
July 7, 1955 
Aug. 15, 1955 
Oct. 6, 1955 


















Paid to plaintiffs ____________ $36, 787.56 
At the time of the purchase of said properties, Mr. 
Judd paid to the County Treasurer, Salt Lake County, 
the sum of $109.88 on the taxes on said properties for 
the year 1950, which w.as defendants' proportionate share 
and defendants are entitled to a credit in said amount 
upon said contract (page 2'4). Defendants had made a 
total payment to plaintiffs pursuant to said contract 
on said November 30, 1955, the sum of $36,787.56, in-
cluding the down payment. N·o payments were made 
after said date. As of said November 30, 1955, defend-
ants were under obligation to have paid to plaintiffs 
pursuant to s.aid contract the sum of $3,673.63 in taxes, 
plus 60 monthly payments in the sum of $600.00 each, 
per month, or $36,000.00, plus the. down payment of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
$10,700.00, constituting a total obligation as of said No-
vember 30, 1955, of $54,699.85 (Exhibit 22). The sum of 
$36,787.56 had been paid· as of said date and nothing 
was ever paid or tendered thereafter. This constituted 
an arrearage on November 30, 1955, on the part of the 
defendants, in the sum of $13,586.07. 
During this period of time when defendants were 
defaulting on their payments on said contract, plaintiffs 
were under obligation to maintain their purchase contract 
from Burge and make monthly payments in the sum 
of $300.00 per month. 
E\TIDENCE RELATI\~ TO NOTICES 
On :.\larch 14, 1955, plaintiffs caused to be served 
upon each of defendants a XOTICE TO REI~-STATE 
THE TER:.\IS OF THE CON"TRA.CT TO Pl~RCHASE 
BY P A Y~IEXT OF ALL DELIXQl"'EXT .A.~IOl ... NTS 
DUE .A.ND 0'\TIXG OR FORFEIT ALL RIGHTS 
l~XDER SAID COXTR ... \.CT AS PRO\"'IDED THEREIN 
FOR FORFEITURE. Said notice set forth that defend-
ants \rere in arrears in the sm11 of $10,734.64 and stated 
in part a.s follo\\Ts : 
... X otiel~ is hereby giYen that if you claim any 
rights under said contract, notwithstanding your 
ngrPPlnent in \Yriting to surrender said property 
to ~eller if the delinquent installn1ents are not 
paid \rithin a re.asonable ti1ne, na1nely 30 days, 
YOU nre herehv notified that said contract of sale 
i~ to hP and i~· ter1ninated and cancelled by reason 
of your defaults and refusal to pay and by reason 
of your rPjeetion of the offer to reinstate said 
eontract." (Exhibit ~). 
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On May 20, 1955, sixty-six days after said Notice 
to Reinstate had been served on defendants and after 
no p.ayment or tender of any nature had been made on 
said arrearage, plaintiffs caused to be served upon each 
of said defendants a NOTICE OF FORFEITURE, 
NOTICE OF TENANCY AT WILL, AND NOTICE 
TO VACATE PREMISES WITHIN FIVE DAYS 
AFTER THE SERVICE OF NOTICE. Said notice set 
forth therein that defendants were notified and required 
to pay the delinquent installments within "thirty days" 
or ,a "reasonable time"; that defendants did not pay 
said delinquent installments and in fact did not pay the 
monthly installments due during said period to reinstate 
said contract pursuant to said notice dated March 11, 
1955, and defendants utterly failed to perform the terms 
of s.aid instrument. Said notice further stated that if 
defendants held over that an unlawful detainer action 
would be instituted against defendants. Exhibit 3. 
Defendants failing to comply with either of said 
notices in any manner, plaintiffs instituted an action in 
the District Court of S.alt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on the first day of June 1955, against defendant and 
prayed that: 
a. Plaintiffs be adjudged to be the owners of the 
real property described in said contract and be entitled 
to immediate possession thereof; 
b. That defendant be adjudged guilty of unlawful 
detainer of said premises from and since May 26, 1955, 
and that plaintiffs have issued by this court a writ of 
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restitution whereby defendants shall be evicted from said 
premises, together with their goods and chattels, and that 
said premis·es be restored to the possession of plaintiffs; 
and 
c. That plaintiffs recover from defendants damages 
for unlawful detainer in the amount of $600.00 per month 
trebled (or at the rate of $20.00 per day trebled) during 
the time defendants shall withhold possession from plain-
tiffs; and 
d. That plaintiffs recover their costs and disburse-
ments herein incurred, and such other relief as may be 
appropriate in the premises, including a reasonable at-
torney's fee. (Pages 4 and 5.) 
E"YIDEXCE RELATI\""E TO REPOSSESSION 
Issue ,,~as joined by the filling of an answer and 
counterclaim of defendants on June 20, 1955, and a de-
Inand for trial certificate .and order were filed. 
In September, 1955, before the Honorable David T. 
Le"~is, one of the judges of said District Court, a pretrial 
''Tas held and at said tin1e and place, namely six months 
after service of said X otiee to Reinstate the Terms of 
thP c~ontract~ plaintiffs adYised said court that plaintiff 
i~ Hinterested purely in the satisfaction of the contract 
and prerPrably by the contract being satisfied by the 
pa~rntPnt. rathPr than forfeiture, and there is no desire 
on hPhalf of the plaintiff to cause the property to be 
forr('itPd if payn1ent can be n1ade in any 1nanner. (page 
~t.) 
(ln NoYl'Illhl'r 30, 1955, t"\YO 1nonths after said pre-
t rinJ, ~nid Honorable DnYid T. Lewis called up said case 
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for trial and again said statement of the position of 
plaintiffs relative to forfeiture was made. During the 
course of said trial, said Judge Lewis called counsel to 
his chambers and advise·d that the court felt the matter 
should be settled and that an agreement might be worked 
out. It was thought a settlement had been reached and 
stipulations made and the hearing was discontinued. 
Said stipulation was never reduced to writing but parts 
of the same were carried out including the plaintiffs 
taking possession of said properties and operating the 
same as of December 1, 1955. Defendants remained in 
the apartment defendants were occupying on said 
premises without payment of anything until March, 1956. 
On March 5, 1957, the Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr., 
one of the judges of said District Court, called said 
case up for trial and again said court was advised that: 
"Plaintiff is interested purely in the satis-
faction of the contract and preferably by the con-
tract being satisfied by the p·ayment rather than 
forfeiture. That there is no desire on beh.alf of 
the plaintiff to cause the property to be forfeited 
if payment can be made in any manner." (Page 
41). 
Said plaintiff, Mr. Peck, further testified .at the trial 
as follows: 
"Q. And is it your desire that this property 
and these premises be turned over to you pur-
suant to a writ of restitution~ 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And if you could get your money out 
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of this contract you would be glad to let them 
remain there, is that right~ 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. .- And yon are asking that the Court order 
that the contract, this uniform real estate contract 
the subject of this action be terminated and b~ 
declared null and void~ 
"A y . 
. es Sir. 
"Q. And you are asking that you be awarded 
treble damages for the unlawful detainer of these 
premises~ 
"A. Yes sir." (Page 64) 
E\7IDENCE RELATIVE TO CONDITION OF 
PROPERTY '':HEX SOLD _._.\_XD RETlX{XED 
Said premises ''Tere in "very good condition." (Page 
81). There \Yere no roofs leaking, no plaster falling off 
the ceilings, the paper and painting ··"-ere all in good 
condition" and it "Tas Hall in good condition." (Pages 80 
and 81). These facts are uncontroverted in the evidence. 
In Dece1nber, 1955, as the properties \Yere returned .and 
\vere again lmder the 1nanage1nent of :Jir. Peck, his man-
ager, ~[r~. J an1es Egan, testified that the conditions 
of the propertic·s \Vere .. terribly run down,~~ that the 
pla~tPr \Ya~ off ~o1ne of the ceilings, the place \vas badly 
i11 nPPd ol' paint, .and that the pre1nises \vere not in as 
good eondi tion "·hpn she returned in Decen1ber, 1955, 
a.~ t1H\r \Vt\rP \rhen shP lt.:\ft in 1950. l\Irs. Egan further 
tPHt i f'iPd that the pren1ises "·ere being i1nproved from 
the titne shP reentered: that i1nproYe1nents "Tere 1nade 
at. 1~1 and 1 :2:~, a ne"r roof \vas put on the four units on 
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Edison Street, that Mr. Peck has put congoleum on and 
has furnished paint for people to decorate and fix up 
their .apartments and that some of the apartments are 
in better condition than they were vvhen 1\fr. Peck took 
over the management again and that in the over-all the 
apartments were in better condition than they were when 
plaintiffs first took them back; there having been new 
pipes in the heating system and that the furnace had 
been repaired (Pages 82 and 83). 
Three or four thousand dollars in repairs had been 
put on said premises between the time Mr. Peck took the 
properties back and Mr. Ashton appraised them (Page 
77). 
EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO FAIR MARKET 
VALUE OF PROPERTY AT TIME OF 
RETURN OF PROPERTIES 
Edward M. Ashton, the only witness c.alled by any 
of the parties to testify as to the fair market value of 
the property, who had been appraising properties for 
a period of thirty years for life insurance companies 
and for private individuals, running into thousands of 
c.ases and a member of the Association of Real Estate 
Brokers and also of the Real Estate Appraisal Organi-
zation of America, a former president of the Chamber of 
Commerce ·of Salt Lake City and twice president of the 
Real Estate Board of the city and once of the State 
of Utah, made an appraisal from "two angles," "First, 
by adding up the value of the ground separate from the 
improvements and putting the improvements separately, 
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and then I have taken it on the basis ·of the economic 
value of the property, based on its operation, gross 
income and expenses, and the net, and I have arrived 
at it in the following manner." (Page42 and 43). 
Mr. Ashton testified that: 
". . . I got $50,000.00 and I figured that that 
would be obtainable from the property if it was 
kept in pretty good shape. But in going through 
the property I found very serious conditions there. 
Some places where the roof was leaking badly and 
wasn't plastered down. Then I took occasion last 
Saturday to employ a man who is an expert 
painter that had been in the business for 25 or 
30 years and he checked it all over and he found 
it would cost $11,000.00 to repaint the interior 
of the houses and the exterior so that made a 
serious situation. So my judgment is that as of 
today the building in its present condition prob-
ably wouldn't be worth any more than about 
$40,000.00." (Page 44). 
He further stated that from the economic standpoint 
the property is worth today about $40,000.00. "But it 
has a potential greater than that," and explained that 
HThe potential 'Yould be this. That if ii was properly 
improved they " ... ould have a greater income than ever 
has been obtained for it~ because over a period of years 
thPy haYPn't obtained as n1ueh fron1 rental as I indicated 
with 1ny figures. But if it " ... ere properly operated and 
thP grounds fixed up, ,y}urh have been allowed to go 
to ])(~]ter ~kelter it 1nakes a different situation there," and 
explained h''ren as of today in its present condition it 
wouldn't be more than about $40,000.00" was stated in 
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reply to the question as to the value of the ground and 
the value of the improvements on the property itself. 
(Pages 44 and 45) 
In explaining how he arrived at these figures, he 
stated " ... in checking the property over very carefully 
I made .an analysis of it, showing the location of each 
building on the ground and compared that with what 
they call the Sanborn Map. That shows, it is a map of 
all of the properties in Salt Lake City; where they are 
located, what they .are, and I find that shown in the 
back of the apartments, especially 121 and 123. There 
were framed porches down there which were gone and 
the building has the appearance of no protection from 
fire. I find probably it needs a new furnace and there 
is pro b.ably $1,000.00 expense there and then a lot of 
things I have discovered. The building in the back of 
125 that has since been removed and the bricks still on 
the premises not removed." 
In the other approach, Mr. Ashton testified that 
from the front foot basis "That gave me $25,815.00 total 
valuation of the land, .. then I figured the total of all 
of these buildings $29,050, or a total of $54,863.00 from 
the standpoint of summing the property up but from the 
economic approach I figured a lesser figure." Counsel 
for the defendants then asked Mr. Ashton, "Well you 
would actually come close to the figure of $50,000.00 
in one case and $54,800.00 in the other~" And in reply, 
Mr. Ashton stated, "Yes. And the thing that made me 
come down to 40 is the-" and counsel for the defendants 
then interrupted Mr. Ashton .and did riot permit hin1 
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to finish when .he started to explain why the value was 
$40,000.00. Mr. Ashton did state that "I would say, Your 
Honor, when you get down to putting it down to market 
value it would sell pretty close to 40 to $50,000.00. None of 
us are smart enough to pin it down to a certain sum 
of money." (Page 52). 
Mr. Peck, on cross examination, testified that Mr. 
Chapman told him (pure hearsay) that he appraised it 
at $61,700.00 (Page 75). Mr. Peck said that Martin 
Turner's appraisal "was $65,000." (Page 76). In reply 
to the question of whether or not the other gentlemen 
(~fr. Chapman and Mr. Turner) were certified appraisers 
he indicated "I think Not" but that he did not know as 
to their qualifications. :Jir. Peck stated that he was 
advised to get a certified appraisal of said properties 
and that was the reason that he engaged the services 
of nir. Ashton (Page 76). 
E\"'IDEN"CE REL ... -\_TlY'"E TO HF ~IR R-EXTAL 
\"'"ALt'"E~~ OF SAID PREJ\IISES 
:Jlr. Ashton in sun1n1arizing the operation and 
rental8 obtained fron1 the pre1nises as reflected by the 
state1nents of the parties, testified as follows: 
.. That if it ,,~as properly in1proved they would 
ha.Yt ... a greater inco1ne than even has been obtained 
for it, heeanst ... oYer a period of years they haven't 
obtaint ... d a8 1nueh fron1 rental as I have indicated 
"Tith HlY figures. But if it "~ere properly operated 
and the grounds fixed up, "\Yhich have been allowed 
to go to h~lter skelter it 1nakes a different situ-
ation there." (Page 44) 
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Mr. Sheffield, counsel for defendants advised the 
court that "we ... have in our hands produced income 
from the property of $51,151.49. That is the income 
.alone," and explained "That includes ~1r. Judd's apart-
ment at $40.00 a month, since it was not a furnished 
apartment for 60 months." Mr. Judd testified that $48,-
871.49 is the total receipts on people we give receipts to 
on all of these apartments and testified that $40.00 
per month, which I figure is the fair rental value :of 
that ,apartment" (the one which he occupied) for the 
period of time until he surrendered the premises to 
Mr. Peck, constituted a total rental of said $51,151.49, 
though Mr. Judd did not actually move from his apart-
ment until the following March, 1956. 
PLEADINGS OF PLAINTIFFS 
Plaintiffs prayed: 
a. Plaintiffs be adjudged owners of said real 
property and be entitled to immediate pos-
session thereof ; 
b. Defendants be adjudged guilty of unlawful 
detainer of premises from and since May 26, 
1955, and that plaintiffs have issued by court 
a writ of restitution whereby defendants shall 
be evicted from premises, trogether with their 
goods and chattels, and premises be restored 
to plaintiffs; 
c. Plaintiffs recover from defendants damages 
for unlawful detainer in amount of $600.00 
per month trebled during time defendants 
withhold premises from plaintiffs; and 
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d. Plaintiffs. recover costs and disbursements, 
including reasonable attorney's fee and such 
other relief as appropTiate. 
PLEADINGS OF DEFENDANTS 
Defendants set forth five separate and distinct de-
fenses and two counterclaims. The first defense was that 
the complaint failed to state a cause of action. This 
defense was abandoned and was never presented for 
argument. The second defense was that plaintiff con-
sented to a change in the terms of said agreement with 
respect to the amount of payment per month and allowing 
defendants to make lesser payments. K o evidence was 
presented on this defense and no argument was made 
and this defense was abandoned. The third defense was 
that plaintiffs did not own, nor were able to convey 
ti tie. K o evidence \Yas presented as to the inability of 
plaintiffs to convey or that defendants were in the 
position to demand conve~~anee and this defense was 
abandoned. The fourth defense w.as that plaintiffs cannot 
give l)Ossession or quiet enjoyn1ent of nor ph~~sical title 
to said 1 >reinises. X o eYidence \Yas presented to support 
said defense and it 1nust have been abandoned. The 
fifth d~fense "~as that by the aeceptance of the pay-
lllPnts that plaintiffs l1ad acquiesced in a change in the 
paytnents for a. long period of tn11e and that there was 
a rPlianee on said aequie~cence. X o eYidence or argument 
"·as n1ade on said defense and the sa1ne "~.as abandoned. 
The First Counterelain1 "Tas that there "Tas an ex-
press and in1plied "·arranty that said premises \vere 
in a fit and proper .and habitable condition for occu-
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pancy as rental p,roperties and apartments and that 
defendants were required to expend approximately $30,-
000.00 to repair the same to the extent necessary to 
pass Bo.ard of Health requirements in order that said 
properties could be continued as rental properties. No 
evidence was presented as to Board of Health require-
ments and defendant testified "it was a suitable place as 
far as rentable building." (P.age 55). Exhibit 23 of 
defendants shows the income rental on said apart1nents 
and on each the income appears constant. No argument 
was made as to .any breach of warranty and said counter 
claim based up,on breach was abandoned. 
The Second Counterclaim was that Pecks were seek-
ing to enforce a penalty and forfeiture against defendant 
which is totally and completely unjustified, and that 
defendants should have returned to the1n the value and 
amount paid into said plaintiffs .and value of said im-
provements in said property, over and beyond the reason-
able rental value of s.aid property, which sum amounts to 
$42,521.50; and that enforcement of the forfeiture pro-
visions herein would allow an unconscionable and ex-
horbitant recovery to plaintiffs, far in excess of any 
loss or damage suffered by them, and that said provisions 
should not be enforced. 
Upon the Second Counterclaim and upon said basis 
only was the issue drawn. 
FINDINGS OF COURT 
The court made and entered its findings of fact, 
findings, inter alia, which found: That a total payment 
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was made by defendants to plaintiffs pursuant to said 
contract, including the down payment was $36,787.56, 
and that there was due and owing on said contract as 
of the 30th day of November, 1955, a total sum of 
$54,699.85, and an arrearage of the sum of $13,586.07. 
To these findings, no exception is taken by the defend-
ants. The court further found that defendants collected 
as rentals on said premises during the period defendants 
were in possession, namely from K ovember 1, 1950, to 
and including November 30, 1955, the sum of $48,751.49, 
and had the use and occupancy of an apartment which 
was used and occupied by defendants as their own 
d\\Telling which had a reasonable rental value of $50.00 
per month during said five year period or a \alue of 
$3,000.00, constituting a total rental received by defend-
ants from said premises of $51,751.49. These findings 
are based on the testimony of defendant (Pages 100-104). 
DECREE OF COURT 
T n the decree of the court, plaintiffs were adjudged 
the o"Tners of said property and entitled to immediate 
po~~e~Rion thereof .and that defendants "~ere adjudged 
guilt~,. of unla"Tful detainer thereof~ plaintiffs 'Yere en-
titlPd to a "Trit of restitution and defendants 'Yere not 
Pntit IPd to any relief on their counterclailus and have 
no equity in said property or prenlise~ and that said 
eont raet i8 null and yoid and ''"'holly ineffective for .any 
purpo~e \vhat8ot~ver ~md should be cancelled and is can-
celh\d and ter1ninatcd (Pages 106-107). 
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APPEAL GROUNDS 
The defendants appeal upon the following "State-
ment of Points" 
1. The court erred in its ruling that the property 
has only a value of $40,000.00. 
2. The trial court erred in excluding defendants 
evidence as to improvements and maintenance costs. 
3. The trial court erred in declaring a forfeiture 
and allowing the plaintiff to retain all of the monies 
paid in by the defendants as liquidated damages, without 
regard to the excluded evidence. 
4. If the contract is null and void as decreed by the 
court, then the trial court erred in not requiring a refund 
to the defendants on the contract. 
5. The fact situation here involved did not justify 
forfeiture under the law of the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS FINDING DEFENDANTS 
WERE IN DEFAULT, FORFEITURE WAS AGREEMENT OF 
PARTIES IN EVENT OF DEFAUI.JT, LIQUIDATED DAM-
AGES IN AMOUNT A WARDED WAS PURSUANT 'TO 
CONTRACT, LIQUIDATED DAMAGES WERE NOT UNCON-
SCOUNABLE AND WERE IN FACT LESS THAN DEFEND-
ANTS TOOK FROM PROPERTIES, AND FORFEITURE 
BASED ON ACTS OF DEFENDANTS AND JUSTIF'IED 
UNDER LAW OF STATE OF UTA.H. 
Staten1ent of Points 3 and 5 of defendants and Point 
I of Plaintiffs will be discussed in the following manner: 
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a. Was the forfeiture of 'the rights in the property 
proper under the terms of the contract· and 
' 
b. Was the allowing the plaintiff to retain all of the 
monies paid in by the defendants as liquidated damages, 
without regard to the excluded evidence, proper. 
The provision of the contract relative to forfeiture 
and liquidated damages reads as follows : 
"In the event of a failure to comply with the 
terms hereof the Buyer, upon failure to make any 
payments when the same shall become due, or 
'vithin thirty days thereafter, the Seller shall, at 
his option, be released from all obligations in law 
and equity to convey said property and all pay-
ments which ha-ve been made theretofore on this 
contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the 
Seller as liquidated damages for the non-perform-
ance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that 
the Seller 1nay, at his option, re-enter and take 
possession of said premises "ithout legal process 
as in its first and forn1er estate, together with all 
in1proven1ents and additions made by the Buyer 
thereon, .and the said additions and iinprovements 
shall re1nain 'Yith the land and become the prop· 
erty of the Seller~ the Buyer becoming at once a 
tenant at "~in of the Seller. It is agreed that time 
is the essence of this agreement.~~ Exhibit 1. 
n. It n1ust be ren1e1nbered that the plaintiffs took 
the propPrti('S OYt'r on Dece1nber 1~ 1955, 'Yith the full 
<·on sent of tht\ derendants t•xcept the ap.art1nent in W'"hich 
,Judds "~PrP rrsiding and continued to reside until n1arch~ 
1 !)!)(). Th0r0 "~as no court order but a stipulation of 
set tl P1uen t "·as in the offing and all thn t is in the record 
is that thP plaintiffs took over the 1nanagement of the 
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properties on December 1, 1955. The properties were 
turned back over to plaintiffs by defendants. The taking 
over and repossession was not over the protests of de-
fendants but with their acquiescence. 
No question has been or is being raised relative to the 
right of defendants to retain possession of the p·roperties. 
The return of the property to the defendants is not being 
sought nor argued. The uncontroverted testimony of the 
plaintiff is that there was no desire on the part of the 
plaintiff to cause a forfeiture in the event plaintiff could 
but obtain his rights under the contract. Notice to rein-
state the contract was given in March, 1955; two months 
later another notice of the termination of the contract and 
the declaration of the creation of a tenancy at will was 
served in May, 1955; and, in September, 1955, six months 
after the first notice at the time of the pretrial, the de-
fendants vvere again advised that there was no desire to 
require .a forfeiture and opportunity was given defend-
ants to make plaintiffs whole and they would thereby 
become whole, then on November 30, 1955, two months 
after the pretrial and eight months after the initial notice, 
a hearing 'vas commenced and the hearing was terminate.d 
to afford defendants every opportunity to salvage any-
thing salvageable defendants might have in said contract 
and properties. 
At the time the first notice was served on defendants 
to reinstate their contract, the defendants were some 
$10,734.64 in arrears. Defendants knew that during the 
time defendants were defaulting, plaintiffs were required 
to keep in full force and effect plaintiffs contract to pur-
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chase these same premises. Plaintiffs were really being 
damaged in having to maintain payments on their con-
tract of purchase when defendants were defaulting on 
their contract. 
In the early case of Rose v. Garn, 56 Utah 533, 191 
Pac. 645, the Supreme Court, State of Utah, stated: 
"No court has ever held that the parties may 
not agree between themselves as to the measure 
of damages that shall be sustained upon the breach-
ing of a contract by either party." 
It would seem that there could be no question of the 
right of the plaintiffs to re-enter and take possession of 
said premises when defendants were $10,734.64 in arrears 
at the time of the giving of the notice to reinstate the 
contract and plaintiffs did not take possession until eight 
months later during which time defendants had the op-
portunity to salvage their interest in said properties; 
after defendants had collected some $51,751.49 in rentals 
from s.aid premises and had only paid to plaintiffs a total 
sun1 of $36,787.56, including down pa~J.nent, taxes, interest 
and principal; "~hen the properties 'Yere Hterribly run 
do"~n~' "~hen the properties 'Yere tali:en over by plaintiffs 
in December, 1955, and "~hen said properties "were in 
YPry good condition·· "~hen the sa1ne "~ere sold to defend-
ants aeeording to the uncontroYerted testimony of ~Irs. 
l~~ga.n ~ t h P 111a nagPr of said properties at the tiine of the 
~al(\ .and iuunediately follo"~ing the return of the proper-
tiPs to l\1 r. 1\~ek. There 'Yas sin1ply no other "~ay out 
n~ l\1 r. Ashton stated that the grounds .. haYe been allowed 
to go hPlter skPlter~' and therefore .. over a period of years 
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they haven't obtained as much from rental as I indicated 
·with my figures. But if it were propertly operated and 
the grounds fixed up" there would have been greater 
income. Plaintiffs could wait no longer and permit the 
premises to continue to degenerate and were compelled 
to retake the premises and this w.as done with the acqui-
escence of defendants. 
b. This court has previously had the problem of con-
sidering whether the application of a liquidated damages 
clause in a contract is actually liquidated damages or a 
penalty. In the case of Cooley v. Call, 61 Utah 203, 211 P. 
977, speaking through Justice Thurman, the court stated: 
"It does seem to the writer that here was a 
candid deliberate attempt on the part of the con-
tracting parties to fix and determine a measure 
of damages which should operate as an exclusive 
remedy in the event that the vendee should default 
in subsequent payments. If the damages stipulated 
in the contract were either inadequate or radically 
excessive, as compared with the probable damage§ 
that could be foreseen by the parties when the 
contract was executed, there might be some reason 
for contending that the damages stipulated were 
not intended as an exclusive remedy, but such was 
not the case, as appeared from the record. Upon 
the execution of the contract, November 25, 1919, 
defendants paid plaintiffs $1,850. During the next 
year they paid one-half of the interest on a $6,000 
mortgage at 6 percent per annum amounting to 
$180, and paid taxes on the property for the year 
1920, which must have amounted to at le.ast $100. 
As to the exact amount the findings were indefi-
nite. In any event the defendants paid taxes and 
interest in at least the sum of $280, which added 
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to the initial payment of $1,850, gives a result of 
$2,130. The final payment was to be made Decem-
ber 1, 1921, or within two years and five days from 
the execution of the contract. So that it could be 
readily foreseen by the parties to the contract at 
the time it was executed just what plaintiffs' dam-
ages would probably be when the last payment be-
came due, even if defendants should default in 
every subsequent payment provided for by the 
contract. A simple mathematical calculation dem-
onstrates that the $1,850 paid by defendants 
amounted to at least 10 per cent per annum on 
the purchase price of the property, of which 
amount plaintiffs were absolutely assured because 
it was paid in advance. Can it be said in the light 
of these facts that the damages stipulated in the 
contract \Yere so excessive, on the one hand, or so 
inadequate, on the other, that it could not have 
been intended as the amount of damages to which 
plaintiffs "-ould be entitled in case defendants 
defaulted in subsequent payments? \\""" e think not." 
Statement of Points X o. 5 is that the fact situation 
here inYolved did not justify forfeiture under the law of 
the State of l 1tah. 
'\That are the facts in the instant case' There ·was a 
rlo\\"D p.ay1nent required of $35,000.00 on the original list-
ill~ \\·hiclt \\·a~ reduced to the sun1 of $10,700.00 under the 
con t raet aetna lly Ina de. There "-as a require1nent of 
$600.00 pPr 1nont.h pnyn1ent on the contract plus ta."X:es~ 
or a total of $7~:.?00.00 per year plus the taxes "'"hich ayer-
agPd. nhont $700.00 pf~r ye.ar or less than $8,000.00 per 
yPnr on the eontra.et. Ho\\~ 1nurh \ras collected by defend-
antH a:4 rPntnls during the fiye year period, \Yhieh !lr. 
A:4hton :4:1 id eould be inrrensed \Yith good operation and 
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management~ The sum of $51,151.49 was actually collect-
ed in rentals during the five year period, or a sum $10,-
230.29 annually, and the sum of $852.52 was actually col-
lected monthly as rentals on the average .and the monthly 
payment due plaintliffs was the sum of $600.00 plus the 
taxes. The difference between what defendants collected 
as rentals ($51,151.49) and the amount paid plaintiffs 
($36,787.56 including taxes) is $14,363.93. At the time 
defendants purchased said premises the contract prices 
vvas $75,000.00, which was the fair market value as of that 
date because there was no force or pressure claimed. 
Mr. Ashton's testimony at the time of the trial was: 
":r.•**So my jdugment is that as of today the 
building in its present condition prob.ably wouldn't 
be worth any more than about $40,000.00." (Page 
44) 
and 1\frs. Egan testified that: since she returned between 
the time that Mr. Peck retook the premises and when Mr. 
Ashton made his appraisal that: 
"*** The property has been improving, other 
than the roof has been put on .and Mr. Peck has 
put congoleum on. He has furnished paint for 
people for several places for them to do their 
decorating and fixing up their apartments." (Page 
82') 
And Mr. Peck testified that he had expended some $4,-
000.00 since taking said premises back. (Page 77) 
In the instant case, the monthly payments arranged 
and provided for by the contract from experience, even 
with poor management and permitting the property to 
become in a state of disrepair, were less than the amount 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
to be paid on the contract and therefore were in no sense 
unconscionable and exorbitant. There was an average of 
more than $250.00 per month cushion for expenses in 
operation. Certainly Peck could not be expected to as-
sume the responsibility for the management and opera-
tion during the period J udds had said properties. There 
was no penalty in this case, as in the Western Macaroni 
Mfg. Co. v. Fiore, 47 Utah 108, 151 P. 984, but actually 
a surrender of less than defendants had collected on the 
premises as rentals was being forfeited. See the cases of 
Dopp v. Richards, 43 Utah 332, 135 P. 98, and Cooley v. 
Call, supra, wherein this court went into detail to deter-
mine if the liquidated damages were compensatory for 
the injury sustained or were penal in nature. In the in-
stant case, the amount being collected monthly exceeded 
the amount he was required to pay on the contract. As 
stated in Bramwell ln'C. Co. v. U ggla, 81 l~tah 85, 16 P. 
2d 913, Justice Elias Hansen speaking for the unanimous 
court stated : 
"This court is committed to the doctrine that, 
where the parties to a contract stipulate the 
a1nount of liquidated damages that shall be paid 
in rase of a breach, such stipulation is, as a 
general rule, enforceable, if the amount stipulated 
is not disproportionate to the damages actually 
sustained. A different rule .applies "~here the 
a1nount stipulated is oppressiy·e, unconscionable, 
or i~ in the nature of a penalty rather than dam-
ages actually sustained.~~ 
In thP ea~e of Croft v. Jensen, 86 lltah 13, 40 P. 2d 
l!lS, the 8l'l1t\r "~as tendered all the n1oney due and owing 
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on the contract prior to the commencement of the suit, the 
amount being $200.00 on a contract upon which $6,500 had 
been paid. Of course, no forfeiture was gr.anted. In the 
instant case, plaintiff at every step of the proceeding 
stated that plaintiffs did not desire a forfeiture but only 
what the contract called for and only asked for forfeiture 
because of the inability of defendants to perform. There 
was still some $54,699.85 due and owing on the contract 
and had the property a marketable value as contended by 
defendants, defendants could have sold said properties 
during the many months .after the notice to reinstate the 
contract and before judgment, as plaintiffs on the day of 
trial offered to withdraw the action if plaintiffs could be 
but made whole, paid off the balance on the contract .and 
had an equity. 
In the case at bar, the purchase price was $75,000.00 
and the balance due on the contr.act was $54,699.85, (Ex-
hibit 22) at the time of the trial, which means that ap-
proximately one-third of the purchase price had been paid 
on the principal. Justice Crockett, in alluding to the c.ase 
of Christy v. Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P. 2d 401, written 
for the court by Justice McDonough, in Perkins v. Spen-
cer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P. 2d 446, stated as follows: 
"While they (Guilds) had paid in approxi-
mately one-third of the purchase price, they had 
paid only $20 to $30 e.ach month over the period, 
plus making improvements on the premises totally 
$2,000. But the property had a monthly income 
to them of $75.00, which exceeded the total of the 
payments they had made plus their improvements. 
After reviewing those facts, it was held that the 
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forfeiture provision· was not a penalty under the 
rule above stated." . · 
·Those facts are practically the same as in the instant case. 
One-third of the purchase price had been paid, approxi-
mately, and the amount collected from the premises as 
rentals was $51,151.49, and there had only been paid on 
the contract $36,787.56. 
The Reinstatement of Contracts, 339, dealing With 
the question of forfeiture is cited in the brief of appel-
lants and in said Perkins v. Spencer, supra, as stating 
as follows: 
"(1) An agreement, made in advance of 
breach fixing the damages therefor, is not enforce-
able as a contract and does not affect the damages 
recoverable for the breach, unless 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable fore-
cast of just compensation for the harm 
that is caused by the breach, and 
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach 
is one that is incapable or \ery difficult 
of accurate estimation." 
C~on~ider in the instant case that Judds ,,~ere required to 
pay to Peeks under the c.ontract the su1n of $600.00 per 
n1onth, plus the taxes earh year, and that Judds collected 
as rPntals an nYPrage of $S3:2.5~ per n1onth. Is that not 
PYidPncp that the liquidated dan1ages 'Yere not intended as 
a penn 1 ty ·1 Plaintiffs ha Ye no quarrel 'Yith the applica-
tion of the rPsta tl'HlPnt proYisions to the instant case. 
AftPr reYil\\Ying the opinions of this court relative 
to the has is of d~unages ordinarily recoYerable for a 
breach of eont ract or excluding .. liquidated dan1ages" 
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which are in fact "penalties" for a breach, Justice Crock-
ett set forth a rule which guided the trial court in the 
instant case and guided counsel in the litigation of the trial 
of the case. See Perkins v. Spencer, supra. This rule is 
as follows: 
"The vendors are entitled to any loss occa-
sioned them by any of these factors : 
(1) Loss of any advantageous bargain; 
(2) Any damage to or depreciation of the 
property; 
(3) Any decline in value due to change in 
market value of the property not allowed 
for in items no. 2 and 3 ; and 
(4) For the fair rental value of the property 
during the period of occupancy. 
"The total of such sums should be deducted 
from the total amount paid in, plus any improve-
ments for which it would be fair to allow recovery, 
and any remaining difference awarded to the 
plaintiffs.'' 
Applying the rule set forth by this court to the in-
stant case, the following considerations must be given: 
1. Loss of an advantageous bargain. The price of 
sale or bargain w.as $75,000.00. The Finding of the Court 
at the time it was returned was $40,000.00. 
2. Any damage to or depreciation of the property. 
Mr. Ashton, a certified appraiser testified: 
"*** If I capitalized that at 7% I got $50,-
000.00 .and I figured that that would be obtainable 
from the property if it were kept in pretty good 
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shape. But in going through the property I found 
very serious conditions there. Some places where 
the roof was leaking badly and wasn't plastered 
down. Then I took occasion last Saturday to em-
ploy a man who is an expert painter that had been 
in business for 25 or 30 years and he checked it all 
over and he found it would cost $11,000.00 to re-
paint the interior of the houses and the exterior so 
that made a serious situation. So my judgment 
is that as of today the building in its present con-
dition probably wouldn't be worth more than about 
$40,000.00." (Page 44) 
"There were framed porches down there which 
were gone and the building has the appearance of 
no protection from fire. I find it probably needs 
a new furnace and there is probably $1,000.00 ex-
pense there and then a lot of things I have dis-
covered. The building in the back of 125 that has 
since been removed and the bricks still on the 
premises not removed." (Page 46) 
On cross exan1ination as to the value of the property 
from the t\\?o approaches used by Mr. Ashton and in reply 
to the question of counsel for defendants. 
"Q. 'V ell you would actually come close to 
the figure of $50,000.00 in one ease and $54,800.00 
in the other'? 
u .. A.. Yes~ and t11e tiring that made me come 
down to 40 is the •:~:••' 
and thPrP he \ra~ interrupted by counsel but he ,yas clear 
that Ht1H' t hinp; that Inndt::' n1e conH? do'vn to 40 ~- 'Yas exist-
ent and the yalue \\Tns not $50,000 or $54,800. (Page 50) 
In reply to the question of the court: 
ul\lr. Ashton, there is a question I want to ask. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
Having in mind when a person not under compul-
sion to buy and one not under compulsion to sell, 
what would you say the reasonable f.air market 
value of the property is at this time~ 
"I would say, Your Honor, when you get down 
to putting it down to market value it would sell 
pretty close to 40 to $50,000.00. None of us are 
smart enough to pin it down to a certain sum of 
money." (Page 52) 
Mrs. Berg testified that the properties were in better 
condition when Mr. Ashton made his ,appraisal than when 
Mr. Peck took the properties back and Mr. Peck testified 
that he had expended $4,000.00 on the properties since 
taking them back. This testin1ony is uncontradicted, even 
by Mr. Judd, who was subsequently upon the stand. 
(Pages 41-42) 
3. There was no testimony that there had been any 
decline in value due to change in market value of the 
property not allowed for in items Nos. 1 and 2. 
4. For the fair rental value of the property during 
the period of occupancy. 
The defendants, Judd, testified that they had income 
from said properties in the sum of $51,151.49 during the 
five years which they occupied the property. That was the 
total rentals. (P.age 86) 
Mr. Ashton testified that with better management 
and proper care these rentals could have been increased. 
Defendants contend that "fair rental value" as used 
by the court does not mean the rentals received from the 
property or wh.at the properties would rent for during 
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a certain period but what the net profit was from the 
rental of the properties. Mr. Judd had a clear conception 
of his understanding of what was meant by "fair rental 
value'' as in response to his attorney's question as to 
his method of computing the rentals of his own apart-
ment and adding those rentals to the total rentals col-
lected from the other apartments, Mr. Judd responded: 
"Well that is computed on an unfurnished 
apartment at $40.00 per month, which I figure is 
the fair rental value of that apartment." (Page 
87) 
Nothing could be more clear as to the meaning of "fair 
rental value" in the mind of the defendant, Judd. The 
court very aptly stated : "I believe, Mr. Sheffield, the 
fair rental value means 'What does it rent for f and it 
isn't a matter of, like I said to you this morning, it isn't a 
matter of determining how much profit is made, because 
one man might make a different profit than another 
man." (Page 68) The court continued: 
"Well, Mr. Sheffield of course I can only as-
sume that the Supreme Court 1neant by the use 
of the words 'fair market value' when they used 
the words 'fair rental value' in the Spencer case, 
I ean only assume that they intended that those 
words mean their technical and legal meaning and 
from the authorities that ~Ir. C.annon has cited 
nnd fron1 "~hat I believe to be more authorities 
along that line I have to assume the Spencer case 
that that is 'vhat thev 1ueant and thev didn't mean 
that fair rental vnlrie 1neant an an1~unt that was 
deter1uined after all of the expenses that might 
lH.} inenrred in accordance "'ith caprice of w·hat 
Pver the operator n1ight be. In other words, I have 
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always thought that you carne to me and you said, 
'There is a house. Now wh.at is its fair market 
value' I say '$75.00 a month as a fair rental value 
and it's the same way with an apartment house, 
or, if you want to t.ake an office building what is 
the fair rental value of the Walker Bank Building, 
the whole building if you were going up there to 
rent it, and then seek to sublease it to tenants, what 
would be its fair market value. Its fair market 
value might be $25,000.00 .a month, or something 
of that nature. And they wouldn't go into all the 
questions of how much it costs them to operate 
it or how much it is going to cost you. That is the 
matter of individual shrewdness and diligence, 
and so forth." (Page 72) 
Corpus Juris Secondum, Volume 76, page 1168, states, 
under rental, sub head rental v.alue: 
"The words are said to be of some gener.al 
and technical rileaning and as applied to personally 
mean the hire of, the revenue from, or the value 
of the use of, as applied to real estate it is the 
value of the use of the land for .any purpose for 
which it is adapted in the hands of a prudent and 
discreet occupant on a judicious system of hus-
bandry. That amount which in the ordinary course 
of business the premises would bring or for which 
they could be rented are the value as .ascertained 
by proof of what the premises would rent for and 
not the probable profit which might accrue, al-
though it is said that it must depend and be meas-
ured by the extent of the property." 
Words and Phrases, Permanent edition, volume 36, 
page 919, reads: 
"Rental value or hire of a saw mill with .a. 
known capacity is the value of the use of the 
same.'' 
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32 American Jurisprudence, s 428, reads : 
"The word 'rent' derives from the Latin word 
'reditus.' In ordinary use, it means the return 
made by one who occupies real estate under an 
express or implied contract with the owner, for 
the occupation of the premises, and is defined 
broadly as the compensation in money, provisions, 
chattels, or services, paid or given in exchange 
for the use and occupation of real estate. Thus 
defined, it includes a 'royalty' based on the output 
of a mine." 
In the case of More v. Deyoe, 22 Hun. 208, the court 
stated: 
"As an item of evidence on the question of the 
value of the use and occupation of the farm, it was 
competent to prove what sum was actually re-
ceived from it as rent. This, of course, was not 
conclusive evidence of the value of the use of the 
farm, but it \Yas competent endenee on the sub-
ject." 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky in Alliso-n '· Cocke, 
112 l(y. 212, 655 S. ''T· 3±2, 52 A.L.R. 1595, wrote: 
~~This is not the ordinar' case of suit for dam-
ages. the vendees have com~ into equity for relief 
ag.ain~t a forfeiture. The relief is granted them 
on tern1s. They 1nust 1nake the vendors entirely 
"·hole he fore tl{ey are entitled to the return of the 
forfeit lllOJH~y. They eannot ask that the vendors 
return to the1n Innney· "~hich has been paid out for 
PX}H\nses. ••• The penalty nan1ed in the contract 
fixl's thP lhnit of rt~eovery. •• 
In J. ll. f_?ra.::icr et al. Y. D. TT'". }·ticks, 17~ -A.\_rk. 1139, 
!2!J2 S.,,r. :H>S, 51 ..:\.L.R. 1~87. the court considered a case 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
of the rental of farm land in which the actual price was 
not previously fixed. In the note in said 51 A.L.R., the 
editor wrote : 
"The court observed that the correct standard 
by which to measure the rent w.as the amount the 
lessor could have rented the premises for during 
an ordinary year, and that he was not required to 
accept a less rental because of unforeseen crop 
conditions which rendered the year unproductive 
and unprofitable to the tenant.'' 
See the cases of Calve v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 
P. 2d 623; and Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2d 124, 270 P. 2d 
442. 
POINT II. 
TRIAL ~COURT DID NOT EXCLUDE DEFENDANTS' 
EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO IMPROVEMENTS AND DID NOT 
ERR IN EXCLUDING DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE AS TO 
MAINTENANCE. 
The trial court erred in excluding defendants evi-
dence as to improvements and maintenance costs, con-
tends defendant in his point 2. 
M.ay I quote from the record the statement of coun-
sel for defendants and the rulings of the court: (See page 
73) 
"~fR. SHEFFIELD : Well the reason I raised 
that at this time, Your Honor, is this: That if 
we're not in a position to deduct from the 
total income, which apparently would be the 
fair rental figure, the expenses of maintain-
ing the property then the net income will 
make no difference and if that is the case then 
we couldn't reduce the rental value of the 
property below the figure which the property 
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actually produces. Now if that is the case then 
under the Spencer case I think that Your 
Honor has resolved the case regardless of the 
factual dispute between us. If this figure is 
the fair rental value it exceeds the amount, 
the total amount which we have paid and if 
that is the case-
"THE COURT: In other words you have received 
more than the fair rental than you have ex-
pended on the property over the period of 
time and you're not entitled to a credit. 
"MR. SHEFFIELD : Well it comes out, Your 
Honor, that we have paid in under our figures, 
we have paid in $36,933.82. We have claimed 
permanent improvements of $15,845.33, mak-
ing the total of $52,799.15. In the two figures 
then $51,151.49 and $52,779.15leaves less than 
$1,000 and, of course, Mr. Peck is entitled to 
the benefit of his bargain which is the aspect 
of the case. 
''THE COURT: ,,~hich could run as high as 
25 to $35,000.00. 
"MR. SHEFFIELD : Well under the very best 
evidence that "~e can put on it only has to be 
$1,000.00 in order to "ipe us out. 
'~THE COl"~RT: Yes. 
"1\fR.. BIIEFFIELD: .. A.nd that being the case 
n1n~~be l~1n anticipating by one "~itness I 
think that as soon as l\Ir. Peck is through w1ry 
l\lr. Cannon 'vould rest and then I would put 
on 1\lr. Judd to establish these other facts and 
that is 'vhere I an1 stopped. So 'vith that in 
lllind f think 'Ye ltaYe finished the case and 
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about all I could do is to make an offer of 
proof at that point in respect to the improve-
ments and then we will just have to test that 
question out." (Pages 73-7 4) 
Continuing on page 89; after an objection to the ad-
mission of testimony relative to maintenance costs: 
"MR. SHEFFIELD: Well, now, Your Honor, that 
brings me to the exact point that I was sug-
gesting, that so f.ar as we're concerned now 
that ends the lawsuit because we can't win it 
now. 
"'THE COURT: Yes. 
"MR. SI-IEFFIELD: I have some additional evi-
dence I want to put in, that of improvements, 
but I see no point in spending the time of the 
Court and counsel on an issue that won't make 
any difference to the outcome of this lawsuit 
.as it now stands. And I was going to make 
an offer of proof as to what those things are, 
then if it has to be, if that issue later has to 
be tried it can be tried. (Pages 89-90) 
Continuing on page 92 : 
"THE COURT: The point I make is this. I don't 
want the record to show that you are shut 
off from proving improvements and cre.ate 
an error in this record for that reason. 
"MR. SHEFFIELD: No. No, Your Honor, I would 
not want the record to carry any such conno-
tation whatsoever. The only point I was try-
ing to make w.as if Your Honor's ruling with 
respect to maintenance is correct then if we 
prove all of the improvements that we claim 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
we would fall short of the Perkins--Spencer 
case. 
"THE COURT: Yes, I want the record to show 
that. I don't want it to show that you are 
being shut off here from proving improve-
ments. 
"MR. SHEFFIELD: No, Your Honor. I under-
stand that." (Pages 92-93) 
From the record, it is clear that the court did not ex-
clude any proffer of proof relative to improvements. The 
introduction of evidence as to operation costs and main-
tenance were excluded as not being an element of "fair 
rental value" as conceived in the Perkins-Spencer case, 
supra. If they were considered an element, the court 
would have to establish itself as manager of each busi-
ness under forfeiture. l~ nder such circumstances, the 
court would eertainJ~~ apply the rule that where parties 
to an action have reduced a difficult unascertainable 
value to a liquidated figure and the parties have by writ-
ten agreement arrived at said reasonable figure of liqui-
dated damages then and in that ease the court is not 
going to reforn1 the contract to substitute its judgment 
for that of the parties previously ascertained. 
POINT III. 
EVIDENCE SUSTAINS FINDING THAT PROPERTIES 
INVOLVED HAD A REASONABLE MARKET VALUE OF 
$40,000.00, AT THE TIME PLAINTIFFS TOOK OVER ACTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTIES FROl\I DEFENDANTS. 
lTnder thP Stnte1nent of Fact and particularly under 
tl1 P subheading inserted in said Statement of Facts en-
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titled FACTS IN EVIDENCE AS TO FAIR MARKET 
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF RE-
TURN OF PROPERTIES the facts of the case are set 
forth in considerable detail. Mr. Ashton came to a higher 
value for the properties in both of his methods of compu-
tation but when he applied the computations to the condi-
tion of the properties then he reduced the value by the 
$11,000.00 it would cost to repaint the premises, and in 
addition he noted that the heating systen1 would need a 
thousand dollars for repairs. This did not include the 
necessary improvements in fire protection, repairing the 
roofs of the leaks and replastering. It should be noted 
that the appraisal of Mr. Ashton was after plaintiffs had 
re-entered and put more than $4,000.00 in maintenance 
upon the premises. There are two hearsay statements by 
Messrs. Chapman and Turner, neither of whom were 
called to testify, and the qualifications of the same were 
unknown to Mr. Peck, who testified that he obtained a 
certified .appraiser in order to receive a competent ap-
praisal. l'Jaturally, the court did not give much credence 
to hearsay statements of unknown witnesses. (Pages 
74-76). Mr. Chapman was subpoenaed as a witness for 
defendants but he was never c.alled to testify. 
POINT IV. 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT REQUIRING PLAIN-
TIFFS TO REFUND TO DEFENDANTS ALL MONIES PAID 
TO PLAINTIFFS BY DEFENDANTS ON CONTRACT TERM-
INATED BY DEFENDANTS BY REASON OF DEFAULT OF 
DEFENDANTS. 
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Defendants proved that the rentals collected on said 
properties were $51,151.49 during the time defendants 
occupied properties. (P~ge 86) 
Plaintiffs proved that there was a contract and that 
there was due and owing on said contract the sum of 
$54,699.85 (Exhibit 22) at the time the property was re-
turned to plaintiffs ; that defendants were in arrears 
$13,586.07, as of said date; that the properties were in a 
deplorable state with leaking roofs, buildings needing 
$11,000.00 in painting just to get them in shape; heating 
system in need of repair ; knocked down building with 
bricks and debris left lying on the premises; back porches 
removed and no fire protection; plaster down; rentals 
during the period collected by defendants amounted to 
$51,151.49, with only $36,787.56 paid therefrom on a 
contract price of $75,000.00, plus taxes and interest over 
a five year period, and "ith all those facts uncontested 
defendant asserts, plaintiff 
"can at best only recover damages for the use and 
occupancy of the premises or such other damages 
as they might be able to prove, and that since they 
proved no such damages, it was error for the court 
to find in favor of the plaintiffs and against the 
defendants **•'~ 
In the e.a~e ei tPd by counsel there "~as no forfeiture clause 
in the rontrnet as in the instant case. It is appreciated 
that this honorable court has paid little if any attention 
to the forfeiture clauses of contracts in any of the cases 
dcter1nined. (1enerally, the court has determined what 
the court finds to he nn equitable solution to the problen1 
and cneh ense has stood on the facts of the case. In no 
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case has the court ever found that because the purchaser 
had no equity and the rights of the purchaser. under the 
contract had been declared null and void that the seller 
was under obligation to return the purchaser all the 
monies paid on the contract, .a.s proposed by point IV. 
CONCLUSIONS· 
Much has been stated in the cases to protect the 
purchaser. In the instant case as indicated in the Earnest 
Th{oney Receipt, the plaintiff was under obligation to pay 
the re.altor's commission of five percent of the purchase 
price, a sum of $3,750.00, plaintiff prayed for treble dam-
ages for the hold over of defendants and proved the hold 
over and the reasonable rental value of the properties, 
plaintiff offered to not enforce the forfeiture provision 
at e.ach step in the proceedings if plaintiff would be but 
made whole, plaintiff notes that practically $15,000.00 
over and above the rentals actually collected were not 
paid to plaintiff on said contr.act, and plaintiff asks no 
affirmative relief even though under the law plain tiff is 
entitled to the same. 
It is earnestly submitted that every consideration 
possible was given defendants but nothing was done by 
defendants to relieve plaintiffs and there is nothing in 
this record of any attempt being made to relieve plaintiffs 
or even give plaintiffs what plaintiffs were entitled to 
under the contract. It is respectfully submitted that the 
defendants defaulted under the contract; that plaintiff is 
awarded nothing and receives nothing that is not pro-
vided for in the contract; that defendants took more in 
rentals from the properties than defendants paid plain-
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tiffs on the contract by $15,000.00; and that defendants 
had no equity in the run down delapidated premises that 
no one .appraised as having anywhere near the value of 
the purchase price and even with the severest application 
of the conditions of the contract plaintiffs are not and 
could not be made whole. It is earnestly represented that 
the judgment should be affirmed with costs to respond-
8nts. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CANNON AND DUFFIN 
By T. QUENTIN CANNON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
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